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DETERMINING DEATH:
THE LEGAL AND
THEOLOGICAL
ASPECTS OF BRAIN-
RELATED CRITERIAt
J. STUART SHOWALTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The perplexing questions surrounding what has come to be rather
loosely referred to as the "definition of death" issue have received more
comment in medical-legal literature in the past few years than perhaps
any other single issue. The subject has been the topic of numerous confer-
ences and countless exchanges among religious leaders, attorneys, medical
specialists, hospital personnel, and ordinary laymen. It continues to be a
key issue in lawsuits around the nation and has been the subject of inten-
sive consideration by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Never-
theless, many issues remain unsettled. -
The question gains interest because it is so unique to our modern era.
From the beginning of history, death was a simple occurrence-one was
either dead or alive. Death was simply "[t]he cessation of life; the ceasing
to exist . " In the past two decades, however, advances in medical
technology have made the standard definition of death anachronistic
under certain circumstances. Artificial maintenance of respiration and
circulation now creates legal difficulties in the areas of homicide, negli-
gence claims, insurance, transplantation of anatomical parts, workers'
compensation, probate law, and taxes. Similarly, difficult ethical, moral,
and social questions surround the determination of when or whether a
t Copyright 1982, The Catholic Health Association of the United States, all rights reserved.
* B.A., DePaul University, 1968; J.D., Washington University, 1971; M.F.S., George Wash-
ington University, 1977.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1951).
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person is medically and legally dead.
Recognizing the controversy surrounding the so-called "definition of
death," and responding to inquiries from a number of Catholic health
care facilities, this article discusses the issues from the perspective of
Catholic health care.
It is important to recognize at the outset that some writers and com-
mentators improperly classify the issue as one of defining death. In real-
ity, however, a definition-the expression of the essential meaning of the
word "death"-is not the central issue. What is truly at issue is the recog-
nition of criteria, beyond the traditional absence of cardiorespiratory
function, which physicians can use accurately, reliably, and practically to
diagnose death. Therefore, this article has studiously avoided using the
expression "defining death," preferring instead to refer to brain-related
criteria for determining death's occurrence as a relatively precise event in
one's personal history. The brain is identified as the appropriate organ
because it is the integrating, unifying force of the human person.
Research for this study involved a winnowing process that has oper-
ated to eliminate many of the topics that, though important, are not di-
rectly concerned with the acceptance of death-determinative criteria.
Among these are: euthanasia, both active and passive;' abortion; the so-
called right to be well born;s criminal and tort liability of physicians;' the
moral implications of extraordinary life support measures;5 the validity
and advisability of the "living will";' the Uniform Donor Act and trans-
plants of anatomical parts; 7 and the right to refuse treatment either for
oneself or for an incompetent.0
The foregoing issues primarily are concerned with answering the
question, "Should the patient be allowed to die"? This study, on the
other hand, addresses "Is the patient dead"?' Furthermore, the study ex-
See, e.g., Fletcher, Abortion, Euthanasia, and Care of Defective Newborns, 292 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 75, 75-77 (1975); Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED.
78, 78-80 (1975); A Right to Die?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 3, 1975, at 58, 58-69.
1 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 2, at 76.
4 See, e.g., Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REv. 999, 1000-04 (1967).
' See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 42-51, 355 A.2d 647, 665-69, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976). The New Jersey Supreme Court, in its historic decision which permitted the removal
of life support systems from Karen Quinlan, stated that there is "a real distinction between
the self-infliction of deadly harm and a self-determination against artificial life support or
radical surgery, for instance, in the face of irreversible, painful and certain imminent
death." 70 N.J. at 43, 355 A.2d at 665.
* See, e.g., Kutner, The Living Will-Coping With the Historical Event of Death, 27 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 39, 39-52 (1975).
' See, e.g., Berman, The Legal Problems of Organ Transplantation, 13 Vn.L. L. REv. 751,
752-54 (1968).
' See, e.g., Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 38-41, 355 A.2d at 662-64.
• One must recognize that in answering the question of when death occurs, the concept of
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amines whether criteria for answering the questions are necessary and
proper subjects of legislative action. Before considering the legal aspects,
however, it is important to review the subject from the perspective of the
Catholic Church's teaching.
II. THEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Quite clearly, the Roman Catholic Church views all life as being sa-
cred from the moment of conception. 0 Pope John Paul II, in the Homily
during the Mass he celebrated on the Mall in Washington, D.C. in 1979,
reasserted the Church's constant teaching on the sanctity of human life:
"I do not hesitate to proclaim before you and before the world that all
human life-from the moment of conception and through all subsequent
stages-is sacred, because human life is created in the image and likeness
of God."'1 From this heavy emphasis on the sacredness of life, however,
one should not conclude that the Catholic Church teaches that life should
be sustained at all costs or that every means of modern technology must
always be employed to maintain a dying person.
That one is not obliged to use every possible means of keeping a per-
son alive, has roots which go back at least to St. Thomas Aquinas and
Francisco de Vitoria in the 13th and 15th centuries, respectively. 2 Aqui-
nas recognized that the obligation to preserve life is tempered by consid-
erations relating to the proper pursuit of one's final end, the "happiness
of eternal life with God."' Is De Vitoria expanded on Aquinas and raised a
number of points worth highlighting here:
(1) A sick person is required to take food if there exists some hope of life.
"death" that is applied will depend on the observer's biases and preconceived notions of the
desired result. Furthermore, the context in which the question is raised may determine the
outcome. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote, "[a] word is not a crystal, transpar-
ent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner,
245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (citation omitted). Thus, what is death for purposes of estate taxes
may not be death for purposes of determining criminal liability for homicide, and neither
may be the proper definition of death for determining when a vital organ may be removed
from a body for purposes of transplantation. In short, scholars and legislators recognize the
need for a workable measure of when someone stops living because serious legal, ethical, and
medical implications hang in the balance.
1O See generally MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN PROLONGING LIFE DECISIONS 1-2 (D. McCarthy &
A. Moraczewski eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as PROLONGING LIFE DECISIONS]; POPE JOHN
XXIII MEDICAL-MORAL RESEARCH AND EDUCATION CENTER, THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES OF
BIRTH AND DEATH 34 (1980) [hereinafter cited as NEw TECHNOLOGIES]; VATICAN CONGREGA-
TION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON EUTHANASIA 1-5 (1980).
NEW TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 10, at 19.
Atkinson, Theological History of Catholic Teaching on Prolonging Life, in PROLONGING
LIFE DECISIONS, supra note 10, at 95-100.
I" Id. at 97.
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(2) But, if the patient is so depressed or has lost his appetite so that it is
only with the greatest effort that he can eat food, this . . . creates a kind of
impossibility and the patient is excused at least from mortal sin, especially
if there is little or no hope of life.
(3) Furthermore, the obligation to take drugs is even less serious. This is
because food is "per se a means ordered to the life of the animal" and is
natural, whereas drugs are not. A person is not obliged to employ every
possible means of preserving his life, but only those that are per se intended
for that purpose.
(4) Nevertheless, if one had a moral certitude that the use of a drug would
return him to health, and that he would die otherwise, then the use of the
drug would be obligatory. If he did not give the drug to a sick neighbor, he
would sin mortally, so it seems he would have the same responsibility to
save his life. Medicine is also per se intended by nature for health.
(5) On the other hand, it is rarely certain that drugs will have this effect [of
preserving life], so it is not mortally sinful to declare abstinence from all
drugs, though this is not a praiseworthy attitude to take since God has cre-
ated medicine because of its usefulness.
(6) It is one thing not to protect or prolong life; it is quite another thing to
destroy it. A person is not always held to the first.
(7) To fulfill the obligation to protect life, it is sufficient that a person per-
form "that by which regularly a man can live." Again, if a person "uses
foods which men commonly use and in the quantity which customarily suf-
fices for the conservation of strength," then the person does not sin even if
his life is notably shortened thereby, and this is recognized.
(8) Thus, a sick person would not be required to use a drug he could not
obtain except by giving over his whole means of subsistence. Nor would an
individual be required to use the best, most delicate, most expensive foods,
even though they be the most healthful.
These principles, which changed only slightly through the centuries,
were enunciated in 1957 by Pope Pius XII during an address to an inter-
national meeting of anesthesiologists:
[N]ormally one is held to use only ordinary means-according to circum-
stances of persons, places, times, and culture-that is to say, means that do
not involve any grave burden for oneself or another. A more strict obligation
would be too burdensome for most men and would render the attainment of
the higher, more important good too difficult. Life, health, all temporal ac-
tivities are in fact subordinated to spiritual ends. On the other hand, one is
not forbidden to take more than the strictly necessary steps to preserve life
and health, as long as he does not fail in some more serious duty.1'
In the same address, Pope Pius XII turned to the question of who should
4 Id. at 98-99 (footnotes and parentheticals omitted).
15 Address by Pope Pius XII, The Prolongation of Life (Nov. 24, 1957), reprinted in 4 THE
POPE SPEAKS 393, 395-96 (1957).
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make the determination of death: "It remains for the doctor. . . to give a
clear and precise definition of 'death' and the 'moment of death' of a pa-
tient who passes away in a state of unconsciousness. 1
For Christians, death is not seen as the destruction or annihilation of
the person. Although dissolution of the spirit-body bond that exists dur-
ing our life on earth is painful, death, viewed as transformation of the
person to a new state of existence, is not. Furthermore, the Christian be-
lieves that he will be resurrected: that the body in some way will share in
the new life promised by Jesus Christ. Thus, the Christian is able to view
the determination of death from a wider perspective than the purely
medical. This understanding provides the proper perspective for ap-
proaching the legal aspects of the determination of death.
III. LEGAL ASPECTS
A. Background
A major focus of cases and law review articles on this subject is the
definition of "death" found in the 1951 edition of Black's Law Diction-
ary: "The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a
total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the
animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsa-
tion, etc."17 To this, the case law has added: "[D]eath occurs precisely
when life ceases and does not occur until the heart stops beating and
respiration ends. Death is not a continuing event and is an event that
takes place at a precise time."18
For many years this venerable language was sufficient in all respects,
and it remains so today in most instances. But the advent of artificial life
support systems has raised serious questions about the traditional legal
concept of death. Thus, Black's definition received much criticism,19 re-
sulting in an expanded new definition in the fifth edition of the
" Id. at 396.
" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1951).
" Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 375, 215 P.2d 478, 482 (Ct. App. 1950).
" See, e.g., Halley & Harvey, Medical vs. Legal Definitions of Death, 204 J. A.M.A. 103,
104 (1968); Horan, Determination of Death, in PROLONGING LIFE DECISIONS, supra note 10,
at 58; Ufford, Brain Death/Termination of Heroic Efforts to Save Life-Who Decides?, 19
WASHBURN L.J. 225, 227 (1980); Comment, Lovato v. District Court: The Dilemma of Defin-
ing Death, 58 DEN. L.J. 627, 627 (1981). Even prior to the advances in medicine which
occasioned the current definition of death, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 360 (rev. 5th ed.
1979), the definition embodied in the fourth edition of Black's was sometimes the cause of
judicial absurdity. For example, in Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952), the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, in resolving a question of survivorship, noted that this defini-
tion of death theoretically required a finding that an accident victim was still alive even
though she had been decapitated, because blood was spurting from her body thus indicating
continuance of pulsation. Id. at 497.
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dictionary.20
It is important to recognize one aspect of Black's original definition:
it refers the reader to medical standards for its substance, and modern
medicine does not agree that death means only the cessation of pulse and
respiration or that it is an instantaneous process. In one sense, from the
moment of birth, one's life is a slow process of dying. Indeed, medicine
can document various levels of death within human experience: heart
death, death of various levels of the brain, and cellular death."1
Thus, the longstanding legal definition, based upon circulation and
respiration, was sufficient for a time when all that was required to pro-
nounce a patient dead was a mirror and a stethoscope. The precise mo-
ment of death was seldom necessary to determine, because if one stopped
breathing and his heart did not beat, he was dead; there was no reason to
be more precise than the day of death. Recent events, however, have
graphically shown the importance in modem society of being able to use
other criteria for determining death and for determining precisely when
death occurs.
Nothing brought these considerations more clearly into focus than
the advent of cardiac transplantation surgery. Indeed, while a heart that
has not been beating for some time is worthless to its recipient, a heart
still beating is indispensable to its owner (at least by the old definition).
The 1972 case of Tucker v. Lower"2 illustrates the point.
In 1968, the decedent, Bruce Tucker, sustained serious head injuries
as a result of a fall. Though heroic measures were attempted, he was una-
ble to breathe without the assistance of a respirator. Approximately 24
hours after the accident an electroencephalogram (EEG) showed no cere-
bral activity. Tucker was removed from the respirator, and following a
period of 5 minutes, during which he exhibited no spontaneous respira-
tions, he was pronounced dead. Authorization had been obtained to
transplant his heart into the chest of a patient who was suffering cardiac
failure. (The authorization was obtained from the local medical examiner
since no relative of Tucker could be located. The diligence of the medical
personnel's search was an issue in the trial that followed.) The transplant
was accomplished, but the heart recipient died about a week later.
When Tucker's family was finally located, his brother filed a wrong-
"0 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 360 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
" See W. Sprrz & R. FISHER, MEDICOLEGAL INVESTIGATION OF DATH 12-13 (2d ed. 1980);
Beecher, Ethical Problems Created by the Hopelessly Unconscious Patient, 278 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1425, 1426-28 (1968); Article, The Time of Death-A Legal, Ethical and Medical
Dilemma, 18 CATH. LAW. 243, 246 (1972).
" No. 72-2831 (Va. Ct. Law & Eq., May 25, 1972). This important case has received some
attention in the literature. See Fletcher, New Definitions of Death, 2 PRIsM 13 (1974); Com-
ment, But When Did He Die?: Tucker v. Lower and the Brain-Death Concept, 12 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 424, 424-30 (1975).
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ful death claim for $1 million. At the close of the evidence the judge in-
structed the jury:
[Y]ou shall determine the time of death in this case by using the following
definition of the nature of death. Death is a cessation of life. It is the ceas-
ing to exist. Under the law, death is not continuing but occurs at a precise
time. . . .In determining [it] you may consider the following elements...
[among them] the time of complete and irreversible loss of all function of
the brain.23
The jury took approximately 1 hour to return a verdict for the physicians
absolving them of the death of Tucker.
A similar case in California decided the same type of issue in a crimi-
nal courtroom. The court held that the defendant, who had shot the vic-
tim, was the party responsible for the victim's death rather than the phy-
sicians who performed the heart transplant, as the defendant had
argued."4 Significantly, the judge decided as a matter of law that based
upon the concept of brain death the victim had died before the physi-
cians removed his heart. Thus he instructed the jury, "since the deceased
. . .was dead, before the removal of his heart, there was no issue of fact
as to the cause of death.""
In both of these cases the courts recognized the nearly unanimous
medical consensus that when the whole brain, including the brain stem,
no longer functions, the person is dead. Furthermore, the cases reinforce
the opinion that determining when death occurs is a clinical medical
judgment, not a legal one.' 6
Unfortunately, general recognition of this position has evolved slowly
enough such that many states have adopted the brain death concept leg-
islatively. These laws, which have met various degrees of criticism from
both legal and medical circles, are discussed in the next section.
2 Comment, supra note 22, at 424.
" People v. Lyons, 15 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2240 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1974). For a discussion of
the Lyons decision, see Friloux, Death, When Does it Occur?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 10, 14-15
(1975).
11 Friloux, supra note 24, at 15 (quoting People v. Lyons, 15 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2240
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1974)).
" See Bacchiochi v. Johnson Memorial Hosp., No. 81-256126 (Conn. Super. Ct., Mar. 17,
1981). The Bacchiochi court stated that such decisions, as disconnecting a respirator in a
brain-dead person, "are best determined by the family, by the attending physicians and by
the hospitals involved, and . . .judicial intervention should be required only where it is
necessary to protect those persons who are acting in their professional capacity from possi-
ble criminal or civil liability." Id.; see Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 432, 601 P.2d
1072, 1081 (1979); Swafford v. Indiana, 421 N.E.2d 596, 601 (Ind. 1981); In re Bowman, 94
Wash. 2d 407, 410, 617 P.2d 731, 732 (1980). The Bowman court stated that "the law has
adopted standards of death but has turned to physicians for the criteria by which a particu-
lar standard is met." 94 Wash. at 412, 617 P.2d at 734; see Schneck, Brain Death and
Prolonged States of Impaired Responsiveness, 58 DEN. L.J. 609, 621 (1981).
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B. Legislation
In all, twenty-nine states had enacted some form of determination-
of-death statutes as of early 1982. The various laws fall into three catego-
ries: (1) those with alternative definitions; (2) those that consider brain
function only if artificial means of support prevent determination of
death by the traditional means; and (3) those that ignore the traditional
standards and refer to brain function only.
The first type of statute was adopted in 1970, when Kansas became
the first state to pass a brain death statute of any kind. The Kansas stat-
ute states:
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the ab-
sence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, because of the
disease or condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to
cease, or because of the passage of time since these functions ceased, at-
tempts at resuscitation are considered hopeless; and, in this event, death
will have occurred at the time these functions ceased; or
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion
of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the
absence of spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary standards
of medical practice, during reasonable attempts to either maintain or re-
store spontaneous circulatory or respiratory function in the absence of
aforesaid brain function, it appears that further attempts at resuscitation or
supportive maintenance will not succeed, death will have occurred at the
time when these conditions first coincide. Death is to be pronounced before
any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation.
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all purposes
in this state, including the trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the
contrary notwithstanding."'
This law has been criticized primarily for having retained, as alterna-
tives, the criteria of both a nonfunctioning brain and cardiorespiratory
failure. According to its detractors, the Kansas law
appears to be based on, or at least gives voice to, the misconception that
there are two separate phenomena of death. This dichotomy is particularly
unfortunate because it seems to have been inspired by a desire to establish
a special definition for organ transplantation, a definition which physicians
would not, however, have to apply, in the draftsman's words, "to prove the
irrelevant deaths of most persons.". . . One hopes that the form the statute
takes does not reflect a conclusion on the part of the Kansas legislature that
death occurs at two distinct points during the process of dying. Yet this
inference can be derived from the Act, leaving open the prospect "that X at
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1981). Maryland quickly enacted a nearly identical stat-
ute. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 54F (1980).
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a certain stage in the process of dying can be pronounced dead, whereas Y,
having arrived at the same point, is not said to be dead. '"28
The second category is represented by Michigan's statute:
A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician,
based on ordinary standards of medical practice in the community, there is
the irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory func-
tions. If artificial means of support preclude a determination that these
functions have ceased, a person will be considered dead if in the announced
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice in
the community, there is the irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain
function. Death will have occurred at the time when the relevant functions
ceased.29
One version of the last category is found in Georgia: "A person may be
pronounced dead if it is determined that the person has suffered an irre-
versible cessation of brain function. There shall be independent confirma-
tion of the death by another physician."3 0 d Another form is seen in a
now-supplanted American Bar Association model statute: "For all legal
purposes, a human body with irreversible cessation of total brain func-
tion, according to usual and customary standards of medical practice,
shall be considered dead."'1 As of February, 1982, however, twenty-one
states and the District of Columbia had not yet adopted a statutory defi-
nition of death.
While certain drafting variations account for the three classifications
of the statutes, one salient feature is common to them all: they either
explicitly or implicitly refer to the standards of medical practice for the
determination of when death occurs. This reemphasizes the fact that, as
stated earlier, death is a clinical diagnosis, not a legal decision. As one
commentator has observed:
What these statutes ... are simply saying is that when [the] brain has irre-
versibly ceased all of its functions [the person is] dead.. . . We should not
confuse that acceptable medical fact with the also acceptable medical fact
that, in any given case, it may be difficult to prove that the brain has irre-
28 Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining Human
Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87, 109-10 (1972). Other authori-
ties expressed this criticism of the statute:
Lawyers, for their part, have made their common mistake of assuming that be-
cause a problem or confusion exists the answer is to pass a new statute. What they
fail to appreciate is that medicine is an evolving science and that what constitutes a
definition of death by today's standards may be inappropriate tomorrow.
MacDonald & Meyer, Medicolegal Notes-Defining Death, 43 MT. SINAI J. MED. 300 (1976).
" MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15 (1021) (Supp. 1981-1982) (emphasis added).
30 GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1715.1(a) (1979) (emphasis added).
"' 100 A.B.A. ANN. RE. 231-32 (1975) (emphasis added).
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versibly ceased all of its functions.3"
Few cases have interpreted the brain death statutes. In one such
case, cfi]State v. Shaffer s3 the defendant argued that the statute was un-
constitutionally vague because it (1) set forth both the brain-death and
the traditional death standards and (2) based the determination on "ordi-
nary standards of medical practice."" The Supreme Court of Kansas
found both arguments without merit, summarily dismissing the first, 6
and stating as to the second:
There is disagreement within the medical profession as to exactly what tests
should be employed to determine death. This, of course, is not unusual
within that profession ...
"Ordinary standards of medical practice" change as medical knowledge
and technology improve. Under the instructions given in this case, it was for
the jury to determine whether the medical standards . . . had been met.
Much of the testimony presented at trial went to this very point. The attack
on the statute for failure to specifically enumerate criteria is held to be
without merit.3
6
C. States Without Legislation
In a growing number of states the brain-related criteria for diagnos-
ing death have been adopted even in the absence of legislation. For exam-
ple, in State v. Fierro,'7 the Supreme Court of Arizona adopted brain-
related criteria in a homicide case. The defendant had argued that the
termination of life support systems by medical personnel was the cause of
the decedent's death and that, therefore, there was insufficient evidence
to convict him of murder." The court did not agree and stated:
The removal of the life support systems was not the proximate cause of
death, the gunshot wounds were, and it was not error to find that the defen-
dant was the cause of the victim's death....
We also believe that the defendant was legally dead before the life sup-
port systems were withdrawn .... [Olur legislature. . . has not adopted a
definition of death. A statutory definition is not necessary, however.3"
" Horan, supra note 19, at 66.
" 223 Kan. 244, 574 P.2d 205 (1977).
s, Id. at 249, 574 P.2d at 207.
Id. at 249-50, 574 P.2d at 208-09.
' Id., 574 P.2d at 209-10. See also People v. Lyons, 15 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2240, 2240-41
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1974); People v. Vanderford, 77 Mich. App. 370, 372, 258 N.W.2d 502, 503-
04 (Ct. App. 1977); State v. Brown, 8 Or. App. 72, 75, 491 P.2d 1193, 1194-95 (Ct. App.
1971).
81 124 Ariz. 182, 603 P.2d 74 (1979).
Id. at 184, 603 P.2d at 76.
Id. at 185, 603 P.2d at 77.
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After discussing the traditional Black's Law Dictionary definition,
the court made reference to a "Uniform Brain Death Act" proposed by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. At
that time, the draft of that proposed statute read: "For legal and medical
purposes, an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation of all
functioning of the brain, including the brain stem, is dead."' 0 The Act
also required the determination to be made in accordance with reasonable
medical standards.
The court then concluded that even though the state legislature had
not acted, adoption of the criterion of brain death was warranted. "We
believe that while the common law definition of death is still sufficient to
establish death, [brain death], if properly supported by expert medical
testimony, is also a valid test for death in Arizona.""'
In Lovato v. District Court,"2 the issue involved the death of a victim
of child abuse whose parents petitioned to prevent the physicians from
removing life support systems.'3 In response to the arguments that a
lower court exceeded its authority in ordering discontinuance of the respi-
rator, the Supreme Court of Colorado stated:
We do not share that opinion. We are of the opinion, as were the medical
experts and the respondent court, that sometime prior to [the disconnection
of the life support systems] the child had joined that innumerable caravan
and moved to his chamber in the silent halls of death.
The prime issue before us is the proper definition of death ....
... With advances, including resuscitative technology and organ trans-
plants, the medical community has developed a more complete definition of
death. There is a wealth of material describing these advances during the
past 10 years. The all but unanimous view endorses the concept of brain
death.
We recognize the authority of, and indeed encourage, the General As-
sembly to pronounce statutorily the standards by which death is to be de-
termined in Colorado. We do not, however, believe that in the absence of
legislative action we are precluded from facing and resolving the legal issue
of whether irretrievable loss of brain function can be used as a means of
detecting the condition of death. Under the circumstances of this case we
are not only entitled to resolve the question, but have a duty to do so. To
act otherwise would be to close our eyes to the scientific and medical ad-
40 UNIF. BRAIN DFsT AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 16 (West Supp. 1982) (superseded in 1980 by the
UNwr. DETERMINA'ION oF DRATH AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 209 (West Supp. 1982)).
4" 124 Ariz. at 185-86, 603 P.2d at 77-78.
42 198 Colo. 419, 601 P.2d 1072 (1979).
48 Id. at 421, 601 P.2d at 1073.
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vances made worldwide in the past two or three decades."
Needless to say, the court adopted the brain death standard. Similar
cases have also arisen in Wisconsin," s Massachusetts," New York,4 7
Washington," Minnesota"4 and Indiana.50
No state has been found in which the concept of brain death has
been rejected." Bacchiochi v. Johnson Memorial Hospital,52 however, is
sometimes advanced as such a case. In Bacchiochi, a physician who had
diagnosed irreversible cessation of all brain function nevertheless refused
to disconnect the life support system unless given immunity from prose-
cution. When the state's attorney would not grant immunity, the pa-
tient's family sued to have her removed from the respirator. There ensued
4 days of wasteful and inane legal hearings, "attended by attorneys repre-
senting at least eight different parties," s following which the judge de-
clined to invoke Connecticut's organ-transplant-related brain death law.
The court, however, reinforced the belief that judicial intervention was
unnecessary and that the medical diagnosis was determinative. After the
state's attorney indicated that he had no intention of prosecuting, the
case was resolved without the procurement of a formal order."
Apprehension on the part of 'physicians, such as that which led to
Id. at 424, 425-26, 601 P.2d at 1075, 1076. This case contains an excellent review of the
medical-legal literature on this subject as it existed in 1979. Id. at 425-31, 601 P.2d at 1076-
80. Colorado has since adopted the brain death concept legislatively. COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-
36-136 (Supp. 1981).
,1 Cranmore v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 722, 771-75, 271 N.W.2d 402, 427-28 (1978) (court upheld a
conviction for murder under circumstances similar to Shaffer without specifically defining
death).
4s Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 251-55, 366 N.E.2d 744, 748-49 (1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).
47 New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 1006-07, 367
N.Y.S.2d 686, 690-91 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1975).
' In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 421, 617 P.2d 731, 738 (1980).
"In re Children's Hosp., No. 49143 (Minn. Sup. Ct. July 11, 1978).
"Swafford v. Indiana, 421 N.E.2d 596, 602 (Ind. 1981).
In Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), a benefi-
ciary under a life insurance policy sued to recover accidental death benefits (ADB). Id. at
790. The policy limited ADB to deaths occurring within 90 days of the accident. Id. Al-
though the decedent did not die until 120 days after the accident, his beneficiary argued
that "[i]t was only because of the extraordinary medical measures taken by the medical
staff' that he lived beyond the 90-day period. Id. The opinion does not further describe the
"extraordinary medical measures," and in fact the court specifically held that "death did
not actually occur until approximately 120 days after the accident." Id. at 791. This being
so, the case is not seen as a rejection of the brain death criteria.
"1 No. 81-256126 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 1981).
" See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND Bi-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH 146 (1981).
54Id.
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Bacchiochi and the hysteria that resulted from the case, has prompted
several commentators to renew the call for statutory treatment of the is-
sues." This Article, however, advances a different solution to the prob-
lem, as will be seen below in the conclusion.
D. The Uniform Determination of Death Act
Special mention needs to be made of the "Uniform Determination of
Death Act" (UDDA). This model statute was proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and has been en-
dorsed by the American Bar Association, the American Medical Associa-
tion, the American Academy of Neurology, the American Electroencepha-
lographic Society, and the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.
The full text of the proposal reads as follows:
§ 1. [Determination of Death]
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of cir-
culatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all func-
tions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination
of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards.
§ 2. [Uniformity of Construction and Application]
This Act shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general pur-
pose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this Act among
states enacting it."
This model law is a thoughtful, appropriate, and realistic approach to
adopting brain-related criteria to diagnose death, and by requiring cessa-
tion of all brain functions, it provides a proper bulwark against euthana-
sia.57 For reasons explained more fully below, the article does not en-
courage efforts to enact a brain death statute; nevertheless, the UDDA is
seen as the best of the various legislative proposals.
See, e.g., Horan, supra note 19, at 58-70; Paris & McCormick, Living-Will Legislation
Reconsidered, 145 AMECA 86, 86-89 (1981).
" UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Acr §§ 1-2, 12 U.L.A. 209 (West Supp. 1982). The UDDA
supersedes the Uniform Brain Death Act which had been approved in 1978. The Commis-
sioners, in attempting to explain the need for the UDDA, stated that "[t]he proliferation of
model acts and uniform acts, while indicating a legislative need, also may be confusing. All
existing acts have the same principal goal--extension of the common law to include the new
techniques for determination of death." The UDDA was drafted to clarify the legislative
intent and to facilitate the attainment of this goal. UNI. DETERMINATON OF DEATH AcT, 12
U.L.A. 209, commissioners' prefatory note, at 208 (West Supp. 1982).
"7 The threat of euthanasia has been cited by some as a reason to oppose brain death stat-
utes. See, e.g., Horan, supra note 19, at 68.
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IV. SUMMARY
This review of the theological and legal aspects of the brain death
controversy shows that there is no moral or ethical objection to relying on
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the
brain stem, to diagnose death, and at least thirty-five jurisdictions have
now adopted this standard. Recognizing this consensus, the fifth edition
of Black's Law Dictionary changed the definition on which much of the
recent controversy centered by adding a separate definition for brain
death while revising the definition of death. The new definition reads:
Brain death. Numerous states have enacted statutory definitions of death
which include brain-related criteria. "A person shall be pronounced dead if
it is determined by a physician that the person has suffered a total and
irreversible cessation of brain function. There shall be independent confir-
mation of the death by another physician."
Characteristics of brain death consist of: (1) unreceptivity and unre-
sponsiveness to externally applied stimuli and internal needs; (2) no sponta-
neous movements or breathing; (3) no reflex activity; and (4) a flat elec-
troencephalograph reading after 24 hour period of observation. An
increasing number of states have adopted this so-called "Harvard" defini-
tion of brain death, either by statute or court decision."
The revised definition of death reads:
Death. The cessation of life; permanent cessations of all vital functions and
signs. Numerous states have enacted statutory definitions of death which
include brain-related criteria."9
There is therefore a serious question whether additional legislation is nec-
essary or would be superfluous in light of the consensus medical and legal
view.
Various reasons have been posited by a presidential commission and
others to justify determination-of-death legislation: (1) to eliminate the
possibility that courts might not accept the brain death criteria;" (2) to
operate as "public acceptance of the brain death concept";" (3) to avoid
delays in diagnosing death and thus to facilitate organ transplantation;"
and (4) to ease the fears of medical practitioners about litigation."
" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
7180 (1976) (citation omitted)).
59 Id. at 360.
Ufford, supra note 19, at 234.
I d.
s' Horan, supra note 19, at 60.
' Ufford, supra note 19, at 234-35. These arguments were recently voiced in testimony
before the presidential commission inquiring into the need for termination-of-death legisla-
tion. The witness argued that a uniform act was necessary in order to set a single standard
for death pronouncements for all purposes; to "avoid maintaining dead bodies on artificial
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Upon close scrutiny, however, none of these justifications for addi-
tional legislation has logical merit. Their major fault is the hypothetical
nature of their premises. That the courts might not accept brain death is,
of course, theoretically possible. But the fact is that no court has ever
rejected it and, given its overwhelming acceptance, none is likely to do so.
Similarly, it has not been demonstrated by any reliable data or other evi-
dence beyond mere testimonial speculation that the public has failed to
recognize brain death or that many organ transplants have been frus-
trated by delays in making the diagnosis.
The overriding impetus behind the movement to enact brain death
laws has been "hysteria in the medical profession." ' There is a "perva-
support systems"; to save the patient's family's emotional and financial resources; and to
"serve as a protection against ill-advised pronouncements of death." PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, meeting III, minutes, July 11-12, 1980, at 1 (Statement of Frank Veith).
The problem was also summarized in 1976 in a report of a Missouri Senate select
committee:
B. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM AN INACCURATE DEFINITION:
1. UNCERTAINTY WITH REGARD TO FUTURE COURT ACTION
Under the common law definition a number of things could occur should a Mis-
souri court be called upon to legally define death in the absence of a statute.
a) A court faced with the decision of choosing between the common law defini-
tion and the "brain death" definition could very well reject the latter.
b) The "brain death" definition could be accepted and rejected on a case-by-case
basis resulting in legal unpredictability.
c) A court could reject both the common law definition and the "brain death"
definition and substitute in its place a new definition of death based on a philosophy
which does not protect the sanctity of life to the highest degree.
d) Even if the Missouri courts reject the Black's Law Dictionary definition of
death and attempt to formulate a standard in line with present medical procedures,
the courts most probably would not have the benefit of extensive non-partisan medi-
cal and legal testimony which the legislature possesses. If the courts were allowed to
define death, a party to litigation might be able to introduce a great deal more expert
testimony in support of its definition than its opponent for reasons such as financial
condition, preparation, etc. Therefore, considering the complexity of the issue, to al-
low the definition of death to be decided judicially does not necessarily insure as
thorough an analysis as a legislative determination.
2. PROTECTION OF PHYSICIANS FROM LAWSUITS AND LIABILITY
Because the common law definition is medically inaccurate, a resulting problem
is that there exists a possibility that a doctor who simply unhooks a respiratory or
ventilating machine following a determination of total brain death, could be found
guilty of homicide or wrongful death. Although there are no instances of physicians
being held criminally or civilly liable under these circumstances, the mere potential
for litigation is a valid concern.
REPORT OF THE MIssoum SENATE SELECr COMMI'ITEE ON DEFINITION OF DEATH 3-4 (1976)
(Sen. John D. Schneider, Chairman) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
" Paris & McCormick, supra note 55, at 88 (quoting Robert A. Burt, professor of medical
law at Yale University).
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sive fear of liability in the medical world,"' 5 and some physicians have
been clamoring for these laws in order to insulate themselves from liabil-
ity. The fact is that a brain death statute cannot prevent lawsuits. There
will still be challenges to the validity of the statute itself," and physicians
will continue to be sued regarding their application of the diagnostic
criteria.
Thus, while there is no legal, medical, or moral objection to the Uni-
form Determination of Death Act or the other brain death statutes, it is
submitted that no statute will lift the "medical-legal fog'1 7 that exists in
some minds. For example, the mere presence of statutory law may not
influence the spouse of the brain-dead patient who perceives a conflict
between religion and the termination of life support equipment. Simi-
larly, the mere presence of statutory law may not prevent a physician who
fears liability from petitioning a court for permission to disconnect such
equipment. Moreover, such a law may not discourage a criminal defen-
dant, intent upon aquittal, from accusing medical personnel of having ac-
tually caused the decedent's death. Finally, the mere enactment of a law
may not prevent the next of kin, by reason of greed or vindictiveness,
from suing the doctor for malpractice and wrongful death.
For these reasons, the UDDA and the other brain death statutes are
not a cure-all. They are not the end of the issue. In fact, they represent
only the beginning of the educational process needed to avoid the scena-
rios mentioned above. Therein lies an objection to brain death statutes:
that in all the uproar surrounding their adoption there is a real danger of
forgetting that serious educational efforts must follow. Physicians must
be taught (or retaught) to rely on their medical judgments without fret-
ting over legal liability. Lawyers must be counseled in the propriety of the
accepted medical standards. The public must become aware that these
criteria represent the highest state of the medical and legal arts.
In at least thirty-five states the brain-related criteria for diagnosing
death have been legally recognized. The medical, legal, and religious liter-
ature reflect a consensus with respect to the propriety of the criteria. The
commotion surrounding legislation is unnecessary and delays the educa-
tional process, which offers the only real hope for solving the problems in
this field. Therefore, what is needed is a major educational effort:
(1) to educate lawyers to the fact that the medical standard equates irre-
versible cessation of the total functions of the brain, including the brain
stem, with death; and
(2) to educate physicians to the fact that the law will recognize this ac-
cepted medical standard; and
Paris & McCormick, supra note 55, at 88.
See, e.g., State v. Shaffer, 223 Kan. 244, 246, 574 P.2d 205, 209 (1977).
Paris & McCormick, supra note 55, at 88.
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(3) to educate families and patients' counselors to their moral obligations
and responsibilities in regard to death.
As one writer put it, "a little commonsense reflection (when ad-
vanced life-support systems were beginning to create these difficulties)
would have solved the problem and headed off much of the unnecessary
great debate which followed ... ."" Although that should have occurred
perhaps 20 years ago, it is never too late to hope that this unnecessary
tempest can be finally calmed.
" Horan, supra note 19, at 59.
